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ATTACHMENT IN TORT ACTIONS IN INDIANA
The view is general among the lawyers of Indiana that an
attachment can be had only in actions based on express or implied contract and not in cases based on tort. Whether such
view is correct depends, of course, upon the proper construction
of the attachment statute, as the remedy of attachment is purely
statutory.
So much of the Indiana statute as sheds any light on this question is as follows (references are to Burns' Annotated Indiana
Statutes, 1926 Revision, with the important words in italics) :
981. The plaintiff, at the time of filing his complaint, or at any time
afterward, may have an attachment against the property of the defendant,
in the cases and in the manner hereinafter stated, where the action is for
the recovery of money:
First. Where the defendant, or one of several defendants, is a foreign
corporation or a non-resident of this state.
Second. Where the defendant, or one of several defendants, is secretly
leaving or has left the state, with intent to defraud his creditors.
Third. So conceals himself that a summons can not be served upon
him.
Fourth. Is removing or about to remove his property subject to execution, or a material part thereof, out of this state, not leaving enough
herein to satisfy the plaintiff's claim.
Fifth. Has sold, conveyed or otherwise disposed of his property subject to execution, or suffered or permitted it to be sold, with the fraudulent
intent to cheat, hinder or delay his creditors.
Sixth. Is about to sell, convey or otherwise dispose of his property
subject to execution, with such intent.
982. No attachment, except for the causes mentioned in the fourth,
fifth and sixth clauses of the preceding section, shall issue against any
debtor while his wife and family remain settled within the county where
he usually resided prior to his absence, if he shall not continue absent from
the state more than one year after he shall have absented himself, unless
an attempt be made to conceal his absence.
983. If the wife or family of the debtor shall refuse or be unable to
give an account of his absence, or the place where he may be found, or shall
give a false account of either, such refusal, inability or false account shall
be deemed an attempt to conceal his absence within the provisions of this
act.
987. The plaintiff, or some person in his behalf, shall make an affidavit
showing:
First. The. nature of the plaintiff's claim.
Second. That it is just.
Third. The amount which he believes the plaintiff ought to recover.
Fourth. That there exists, in the action, some one of the grounds for an
attachment above enumerated.

This statute has been in force since 1852. Prior to that date
the attachment statute similarly provided that a debtor's prop-
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erty could be attached, but in addition required that the affidavit should set out the nature of the contract by reason of which
the plaintiff had a right to recover his debt or damage. It is
therefore clear that prior to the Code of 1852 attachment did
not lie in tort actions.
This question of the construction of the present attachment
statute apparently has never been passed upon by either of the
appellate courts of the state. However, the case of Shedd et al.
v. Calumet ConstructionCompany,' decided by the United States
Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, on appeal from
the District Court for Indiana, squarely holds that an attachment in a tort action is authorized by the Indiana statute. This
decision is not binding on our courts, but should be given considerable weight as a precedent, especially in view of the fact
that Judge Baker, one of the judges, had formerly been a member of our Supreme Court. In that case the court says, after
citing the statute (Sec. 981) :
"A tort action in attachment was brought in the Indiana state court by
defendant in error company against the Shedds, plaintiffs in error, and removed to the federal court. The service was by publication. One of the
alleged errors is in the overruling of the Shedds' motion to quash the
attachment and service, upon the ground that the statutes of Indiana do not
authorize attachment in actions in tort. The statute authorizes attachment
upon the grounds therein stated, "where the action is for the recovery of
money." Section 947, Burns' R. S. Ind. 1914. Notwithstanding the statute
has been long in force, we are unable to find that this question of its construction has been passed upon by any Indiana court of review, and counsel on both sides say it has mot. The right of attachment exists by statute, and concededly, where the statute does not clearly authorize attachment in actions ex delicto, the right does not exist. In some of the states,
where, as in Indiana, the right of attachment is given in actions "for recovery of money," it has been held applicable to actions in tort as well as in
contract. Davidson v. Owens, 5 Minn. 50 (Gil. 50); Thompson v. Stringfellow, 119 Ala. 317, 24 South. 849; Cain v. Perfect, 89 Kan. 361, 131 Pac.
573; Collins v. Stanley, 15 Wyo. 282, 88 Pac. 620, 123 Am. St. Rep. 1022;
Kidd ,v.
Seifert, 11 Okl. 32, 65 Pac. 931; Lagerwahl v. White, 154 Ky. 162,
156 S.W. 1079; Carolina Agency Co. v. Garlington,85 S. C. 114, 67 S.E.
225; Sturdevant v. Tuttle, 22 Ohio St. 111.
The statutory expression, "for the recovery of money," is surely broad
enough to include such actions, which manifestly have for their sole purpose the recovery of money. In the absence of any limitation by construction of the Indiana courts, we do not, under the circumstances, feel
warranted in circumscribing it as contended for, and we therefore hold
that the alleged error predicated on the denial of the motion to quash the
attachment is not well grounded."

A careful analysis of the statute shows the correctness of the
Federal decision. The use of the words creditors, debtors and
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claims shows an intent to include tort actions. The term creditors as used in the statute relating to fraudulent conveyances includes persons having claims arising from torts.2 The word
debtor has been held to include a tort feasor. 3 The term claim
is not limited to contract rights but embraces causes of action
sounding in tort as well.4
It is worthy of note that at least one case of attachment in a
tort action has been appealed and affirmed in this state without
the present question being raised. 5 As such a case is usually
found only by accident, there are probably others similarly hidden in our reports. It indicates that the legal profession did
not question the right to an attachment in a tort action for many
years after the attachment statute was in force.
The foregoing considerations would seem to leave little doubt
that in Indiana an attachment will lie in tort actions. The distinctions between attachment and garnishment should be kept
in mind, however, as the garnishment statute (Sec. 1002) expressly limits that remedy to actions based on contract.
WILLIAM R. RINGER.
Of the IndianapolisBar.

2Pennzngton v. Clifton (1858), 11 Ind. 162; Rhodes v. Green (1871),
86 Ind. 7, Shean v. Shay (1873), 42 Ind. 375; Bishop et at. v. Redmond
(1882), 83 Ind. 157.
8 Westmoreland v. Powell (1877), 59 Ga. 256.
4Barrett v. Mobile (1901), 129 Ala. 179, 30 So. 36.
5 Gephart v. Burkett (1877), 57 Ind. 378.

